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Abstract
We investigate the existence of an ‘electoral cycle bias’ in the timing of media coverage
of news with high political value. In particular, we analyze how the electoral cycles
at the regional level influence the coverage of news about corruption scandals in the
Italian Regional Health Systems by two important national newspapers having oppo-
site ideology, La Repubblica (left-wing oriented) and Il Giornale (right-wing oriented).
Our findings show that Il Giornale produces more articles about corruption scandals
involving left-wing politicians in the days right before the elections, while it reduces
the number of those about right episodes of corruption and without any political con-
nection. Instead, for La Repubblica we do not find any evidence of the existence of
neither an electoral cycle, nor an ideological bias in the coverage of corruption. These
results are robust to different model specifications, the potential endogeneity of some
elections, and different measures of the time to the elections.
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Introduction
Do media faithfully report misconduct of elected officials? Or do they silence political
scandals? As watchdogs of political institutions, the role of media is certainly crucial
for the proper working of a democracy. But, in recent years, the growing importance
of media in everyday life has gone hand in hand with a decline in political involvement
and participation by citizens, a ‘media-democracy paradox’ which has been originated
also by the changing role of the media system (McChesney, 2015). Increasingly powerful
commercial media firms may be not dedicated exclusively to watchdog journalism in their
coverage of politically relevant news for different reasons (Entman, 2012; Gratton et al.,
2017). First, since profits are positively influenced by the number of readers or viewers,
supply of news could be driven by users’ preferences, leading media to cover more easy-
to-consume news to the detriment of information more important for the accountability of
the political system but less attractive for the public (Ho and Liu, 2015; Sen and Yildirim,
2015). However, media outlets could have their own ideological stance, which implies a
bias in the supply of political news affecting the selection of both the topic to be covered
and how it is presented and discussed (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005; Gentzkow and
Shapiro, 2010).
In this paper we are interested in understanding whether media try to affect voters’ opinions
when these matter most, much like incumbent politicians try to do increasing for instance
more visible categories of public spending when elections get closer. In particular, we study
if, and how, the coverage of politically relevant news by media outlets varies with respect
to the electoral cycle, a dimension of media bias so far left unexplored by the literature.
To identify this ‘electoral cycle bias’ in politically relevant news, we build a new original
database containing all the articles about corruption scandals related to public health care
in the Italian regions published during the period 2002-2014. We consider news about
corruption in public health care since these are the most salient for voters in regional
elections, as long as health spending is by far the most important item in regional budgets
in Italy (about 75% of total spending). As for media, we focus on the behavior of two of the
most important Italian newspapers, La Repubblica and Il Giornale, and we analyze how
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the production of articles about corruption varies according to the regional electoral cycles,
the newspaper’s ideology, and their interaction. We choose La Repubblica and Il Giornale
since, among the Italian national newspapers, they are – in a slightly different manner –
both those with a clear political stance and those with the highest diffusion among the
individuals sharing the same political view, which makes them the reference newspapers
for the median left-wing and right-wing voter respectively.
There are at least two reasons of why the coverage of these politically salient news by
media may change with the electoral cycle. On the one hand, since the informational value
of corruption news for readers is likely to be higher before than after the elections, when
voters are assessing new candidates and the performance of incumbents, the demand for
politically relevant news will also be higher in pre-election period (a demand-side effect).
On the other hand, however, since the media has its own ideological stance, the supply of
political news may be affected also by this bias, especially if the content of the news may
have important political consequences (a supply-side effect).
The analysis of how the coverage of news about corruption scandals varies with respect
to electoral cycles represents an ideal setting for testing the interaction between demand-
and supply-side effects. Our findings – which are robust with respect to different model
specifications, the potential endogeneity of some elections, and to different measures of
the time to the elections – suggest the presence of a ‘partisan electoral cycle’ only for Il
Giornale. In particular, Il Giornale produces significantly more articles about corruption
scandals involving left-wing politicians in election times than in other periods (about 38%
of its standard deviation in the daily number of articles about left episodes of corruption),
and at the same time it reduces the coverage of those involving right-wing politicians (about
55% of its standard deviation for this type of episodes), or those involving any political
party (around 150% of its standard deviation for this type of episodes). On the contrary,
even if it seems to report about corruption episodes more than Il Giornale, the coverage of
corruption scandals by La Repubblica does not appear to be significantly affected neither
by the electoral cycle, nor by its ideology. We argue that these differences between the two
newspapers are mainly due to the different number of readers and the different degree of
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ideological polarization of these readers. Furthermore, while we can only provide anecdotal
evidence on the political consequences of newspapers’ behavior, we believe our findings can
help shed additional light on recently discovered ‘corruption cycles’ (Sidorkin and Vorobyev,
2017).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the relevant
literature, Section 2 presents our new dataset with some descriptives, whereas in Section
3 we describe the empirical strategy. In Section 4 we discuss the results and in Section 5
we check their robustness. Finally, Section 6 provides some final remarks.
1 Literature review
As the theoretical literature on political budget cycles suggests, incumbent politicians try
to influence voters’ behavior in different ways as the elections gets nearer.1 First, to
increase their chances of being reelected, they might reduce unemployment in pre-election
years as in the original contribution by Nordhaus (1975); second, they might pursue an
expansionary budgetary policy to signal their competence to voters before elections as in
Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and Shi and Svensson (2006); or they might decide
to target pivotal groups of voters by increasing specific categories of spending (e.g. Drazen
and Eslava (2010), Potrafke (2010) and Klomp and De Haan (2013)). Empirical evidence
on these arguments – surveyed, e.g., in De Haan (2013) – indicates that political budget
cycles are more likely to occur in younger than in more mature democracies, even though
the mechanism driving the result is far from clear: some authors, for instance, hint at
the role of media in providing correct information to the electorate (e.g. Brender and
Drazen (2006) and Shi and Svensson (2006)). Additionally, whether these strategies bring
real benefits to incumbent politicians is still an under-researched area, and the evidence is
mixed (De Haan, 2013) .
While public spending and deficit are considered as variables that should positively affect
voters’ opinions about incumbent politicians, similar arguments could be made in relation
1For a comprehensive survey on opportunistic and partisan budget cycles, see, e.g. Dubois (2016)
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to variables that are evaluated negatively by voters. For instance, in countries where
corruption is common practice, abstaining from bribes before elections could also be a
strategy available to elected officials to gain more votes. This argument should give rise to
corruption cycles in countries where politicians are elected,2 but this would be true only
if corruption is detected and made public as soon as an official receives bribes. However,
corruption is unobservable, people have perceptions about the level of corruption in public
life, and perceptions are driven also by the media coverage reporting about corruption
episodes.
As discussed in the Introduction, also media are strategic players in this game, and they
should take into account users’ preferences on the one hand, but also have their own
ideology on the other hand (especially if media owners are the politicians themselves).
The existence of a bias in media reporting is investigated by a recent strand of literature
in political economy.3 This bias might be related to the several dimensions on which
newspapers can operate an ideological selection: the issue to be covered (Duggan and
Martinelli, 2011; Di Tella and Franceschelli, 2011; Larcinese et al., 2011; Puglisi and Snyder,
2011), which aspects of the issue to highlight or exclude (Alaoui and Germano, 2012), how
to present and discuss the facts (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2010; Hassett and Lott., 2014),
and how to select the sources of the news (Sobbrio, 2014a). The bias can originate from
both the supply- and (or) the demand-side of the market for news. On the supply side,
media owners (Duggan and Martinelli, 2011; Di Tella and Franceschelli, 2011), as well as
editors and journalists (Baron, 2006), might have incentives to bias the coverage of news
according to their own ideology, or simply to get private benefits. For instance, Gentzkow
et al. (2006) show how the importance of such incentives depends on how much profits the
media would lose (from both advertising and circulation) by biasing the news coverage.
On the demand-side, since media outlets are profit maximizing agents, they might bias the
news coverage in order to attract as many readers as possible to increase their revenues.
2On an empirical exercise on corruption cycles in Russia, a country where politicians are instead appointed,
see, e.g., Sidorkin and Vorobyev (2017)
3See Prat and Stro¨mberg (2013) and Sobbrio (2014b) for a complete review of the many findings, theoretical
and empirical, produced by the political economy of mass media literature.
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This is especially true in a context in which readers are affected by cognitive biases. For
instance, the presence of a confirmation bias – affecting the way in which individuals
generally elaborate information – might lead the media to select both the news to be
published (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) and its own sources of information (Sobbrio,
2014a). However, also in the presence of a perfectly rational audience, the incentives to bias
could originate both from a reputational game among media outlets to attract more readers
(Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006), or from the limitations of the communication technology
offered by newspapers (Chan and Suen, 2008).
The empirical literature on this topic, mainly on the US, suggests the importance of both
the demand- and the supply-side of the market for news, depending on the dimension
of the bias and the way in which this is measured. For instance, findings by Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2010) show that newspapers biasing their own vocabulary towards the right-
wing do circulate more within areas recording a higher presence of Republican voters, thus
providing a strong positive evidence in favor of the demand-side story. Instead, Puglisi and
Snyder (2011) provide a more heterogeneous picture, finding that actually the supply-side
story plays a crucial role in determining the bias in the coverage of political scandals by US
newspapers. In particular, newspapers more likely to endorse the Democratic party at the
elections give more coverage of scandals involving Republicans, while the reverse is true for
Republican-leaning newspapers. However, newspapers follow readers’ specific preferences
in the coverage of local scandals, regardless of their own political position, signaling a
definitively more important role for the demand-side story in this case.
In this paper we contribute to this literature on media bias by providing a first analysis of
a new dimension on which the ideological bias in the coverage of news by media can take
place, that is the timing of coverage. We also provide additional evidence of an important
element for the political budget cycle literature, as media reporting of what politicians
actually do is likely to affect voters’ perceptions even with respect to variables like public
spending and deficit.
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2 Media coverage of corruption scandals in the Italian NHS
In order to test the existence of an ‘electoral cycle bias’ in the media coverage of news
about corruption scandals, we focus on episodes concerning the Italian regions and related
to the National Health System (NHS) published during the period 2002-2014. The main
reason for this choice is the importance for voters in regional elections of news concerning
corruption practices in their Regional Health System. Indeed, according to Constitutional
rules, the Italian NHS is a regional system that assign to regions the ultimate responsibility
of managing (and partly funding) health care services, and health care spending represents
by far the largest share in regional expenditures (Turati, 2013). While differences in per
capita spending are mitigated by an allocation formula accounting for needs, with central
government redistributing resources toward less fiscally autonomous regions, there is a large
variability across regions in terms of both inefficient and inappropriate spending (Francese
et al., 2014; Piacenza and Turati, 2014). Corruption is part of the inefficient spending, but
is definitely less well known and studied.
Here we consider an original database counting the number of articles on cases of corruption,
involving or not politicians, produced by two important Italian nationwide newspapers, La
Repubblica and Il Giornale, that are also characterized by a clear ideological orientation.
On the one hand, La Repubblica was founded in 1976 and since its origins it has chosen
to place itself within the Italian secular and reformist left4; since 1987 it has been one of
the most read Italian newspaper at national level.5 On the other hand, Il Giornale was
created in 1974, with a more centrist attitude than La Repubblica, but as soon as its new
owner, Mr. Silvio Berlusconi6, decided to enter into politics in 1994 it started assuming
political positions definitively closer to the Italian right-wing parties, Mr. Berlusconi be-
ing the leader of right-wing parties during the last 20 years. In terms of the size of its
4The name of the newspaper is a tribute to a small Portuguese newspaper (Repu´blica), controlled by its own
workers, which provided influential information during the “Carnation” revolution in Portugal in 1974.
5It has alternated the first place with Il Corriere della Sera.
6Actually, he became the greatest shareholder of the company controlling Il Giornale (Societa´ Europea di
Edizioni S.p.A.) in 1979, but up to his decision to enter into politics, which occurred in 1994, he had never
openly interfered with the editorial line of the newspaper, which was always consistent with its original
centrism.
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readership, although it is the biggest among the national right-wing leaning newspapers,
it is dramatically smaller than for La Repubblica, accounting on average for less than half
of the size of the readership of this newspaper.7
The articles are selected from the Factiva archive by applying a specific searching procedure
by sensitive keywords, which is described in details in the Appendix A. The Factiva archive
is a commercial database containing the production of several national and international
media outlets, among which also the two Italian newspapers considered in our analysis,
since the beginning of their digitalisation, corresponding to 2005 for La Repubblica and
to 2002 for Il Giornale. Once selected the articles, we determine: the specific case of
corruption discussed, the Italian region which it refers to, the newspaper producing it
and the publishing date. Then, for each case, still using the information contained in the
articles, we determine whether it involves left-wing politicians, right-wing politicians or
any political party. Finally, for all the days in which at least an article is observed, we
calculate the total number of articles about corruption scandals published by newspaper,
region and political affiliation of the individuals involved in scandals.
At the end of this procedure we collected 1296 articles about 155 different corruption
scandals related to the NHS published by the two Italian newspapers, corresponding to
1058 daily observations within the period 2002-2014, that is on average an article each
3.7 days and 1.2 articles per each observation. Among 155 corruption scandals, 19 involve
left-wing politicians, 40 right-wing politicians while 96 any political party.
Figure 1 presents the geographical distribution of the corruption scandals across Italian
regions, differentiated by the political orientation of people involved.
The highest number of corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians are recorded in
Puglia (8 cases) and Calabria (4 cases); the highest number of cases involving right-wing
politicians is in Lombardia (15 cases) and Lazio (6 cases); while the greatest number of
scandals without any political connection is recorded in Puglia (21 cases) and Campania
(16 cases).
7According to data provided by Agenzia Diffusione Stampa (ADS), the authority certifying the data about
the diffusion of the Italian newspapers, the average number of copies daily sold during the period 2002-2014
is around 484,000 for La Repubblica and slightly more than 177,000 for Il Giornale.
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9Figure 1: Geographical distribution of corruption scandals.
Note: The maps show the geographical distribution of the cases of corruption scandals in the Italian regions
related to the NHS reported from 2002 to 2014, disentangled by political orientation of the individuals
involved in the scandals.
Table 1 shows additional descriptive statistics about the distribution of the articles by
newspapers and political orientation of the individuals involved in the scandals.
La Repubblica
Left episodes Right episodes NP episodes Total
Number of articles 307 346 308 961
Average number of articles per observation 0.40 0.45 0.40 1.23
S.D. of the number of articles per observation 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.62
Maximum number of articles per observation 4 5 6 6
Il Giornale
Left episodes Right episodes NP episodes Total
Number of articles 96 113 126 335
Average number of articles per observation 0.34 0.40 0.45 1.19
S.D. of the number of articles per observation 0.55 0.65 0.74 0.61
Maximum number of articles per observation 3 4 6 7
Table 1: Summary statistics.
Note: The table shows the total number of articles about corruption scandals related to the NHS in the
Italian regions, the total number of daily observations, the average, the standard deviation (S.D.) and the
maximum number of articles per observation, all disentangled by newspaper and political orientation of the
individuals involved in the scandals.
La Repubblica produces in general more articles about corruption scandals than Il Gior-
nale, regardless of the political orientation of the people involved, and despite the shorter
observational window within the Factiva archive for the former than for the latter. Such
differences could be due to a general stronger attention this newspaper pays to corruption,
but also to the higher number of pages making La Repubblica8, allowing for a higher num-
ber of articles published in the same issue. Indeed, by looking at the total distribution of
the number of articles for each observation, it is easy to see that the differences between
the two newspapers are dramatically reduced, with La Repubblica publishing on average
1.23 articles per episode of corruption with a standard deviation (S.D.) of 0.40, while Il
Giornale 1.19 articles with a S.D. of 0.45. With respect to the political orientation of
the corruption scandals, La Repubblica seems to publish in absolute terms slightly more
articles about right episodes of corruption, while Il Giornale writes more about episodes
8According to our calculations on the information provided by the Factiva archive, the average number of
pages of La Repubblica over the time interval considered in this analysis is 60, while for Il Giornale is 40.
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Figure 2: Geographical distribution of the articles about corruption scandals.
Note: The maps show the geographical distribution of the cases of corruption scandals in the Italian
regions related to the NHS, as produced by La Repubblica (upper part) and Il Giornale (bottom part) from
2002 to 2014 and further disentangled by political orientation of the individuals involved in the scandals.
not involving politicians.
Figure 2 maps the geographical distribution of the articles over the Italian territory for the
two newspapers.
Most of the articles produced by La Repubblica about left episodes of corruption refer
to Abruzzo, Liguria and Puglia, those about right-episodes mostly relate to Lombardia,
Lazio, Piemonte and Puglia, while those not involving political parties are definitively
more numerous, including half of the Italian regions. Instead, according to the maps in the
bottom panel of Figure 2, Il Giornale confirms a general lower propensity to publish news
about corruption, focusing only on Puglia and Abruzzo for the left episodes of corruption,
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in Lombardia for the right episodes and on Liguria and Lombardia for those without any
political connection.
3 Empirical strategy
The aim of this work is to assess whether there exists an ‘electoral cycle bias’ in the coverage
of news with high political value by newspapers and how this interacts with the ideological
stance of the papers. The choice to focus on news about corruption scandals related to the
NHS in the Italian regions is motivated by the fact that these news are very important for
the readers’ to assess the performance of politicians and political parties at the local level,
and we expect their coverage to be influenced by demand- and supply-side variables along
the electoral cycle. Indeed, from the reader’s point of view, as the elections approach, the
value she attaches to news about corruption scandals increases, as knowing about misuses
of public resources might help to cast her vote knowingly at the elections.9 This implies
that also the coverage of corruption scandals by the media will possibly increase following
the increase in the demand for this kind of news. Moreover, just given the potentially
strong effects they might have on the voters’ preferences, whether an electoral cycle in
their coverage does exist, then there would be a clear incentive for the media to slant
it according to their own ideology, trying to affect the electoral results. In particular,
if an ‘electoral cycle bias’ does exist, we should observe that the two newspapers cover
more corruption scandals as the election approaches (demand-side effect), emphasizing
those scandals involving the political party opposite to the their own ideology, and leaving
unaltered, or even reducing, the coverage of those involving politicians closer to their
ideology, or with any political connection (supply-side effect).
In order to test for the presence of this ‘electoral cycle bias’, we estimate the following
Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model:
9Costas-Pere`z et al. (2012) analyze the effect of the availability of information about corruption scandals
on electoral outcomes using Spanish data, and they find a strong and significant negative effect on the
incumbent’s vote share after a corruption scandals.
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Articlescijt = β0 + β1Repi + β2Electionjt + β3Repi ∗ Electionjt+
+
m∑
βmX + ηj + θm + δd + γy + εijt
(1)
where the dependent variable Articlescijt is defined - according to Puglisi and Snyder (2011)
- as the number of articles produced on a specific corruption episode at the date t (a day
between October 19th 2002, and April 10th 2014) by the newspaper i (La Repubblica, Il
Giornale) about corruption scandals occurred in the region j, separately for each possible
political orientation of people involved in the scandals c (Left episodes, Right episodes,
No-political episodes).
In particular, we regress the number of articles on a constant, a dummy variable (Repi)
indicating if the newspaper i is La Repubblica, a dummy variable (Electionjt) signaling if
the date t is within 14 days before the next electoral round in region j, their interaction
(Repi ∗Electionjt), several time-varying controls, region-fixed effects (ηj), month-fixed ef-
fects (θm), day-fixed effects (δd) year-fixed effects (γy) and an error term εijt (with standard
errors adjusted for heteroschedasticity and clustered by newspaper within each region).
More specifically, β1 tells us the different number of articles produced per each episode by
La Repubblica with respect to Il Giornale in no electoral times. β2 provides the difference
in the number of articles produced per episode by Il Giornale within 14 days from the elec-
tion with respect to other periods. β3 represents how much the difference in the number
of articles per observation between the two newspapers varies as the election draws near,
while β2 + β3 how much the number of articles produced per episode by La Repubblica
within 14 days from the election differs with respect to other periods. Identification is
guaranteed by the exogeneity of the electoral date few days before the elections take place,
since the call for elections is a process requiring several months. However, we will also
discuss the potential endogeneity of some rounds of elections with respect to corruption
news in what follows.
The set of controlsX includes variables varying at different lags of time, some possibly with
monthly variation, while some others by year. The complete list of controls is in Appendix
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B, together with a brief description and the source of data. Starting from the first group, it
is reasonable to assume that the higher is the number of corruption cases already detected,
the higher will be the probability that a newspaper will publish news about them. Thus,
we control for both the total number of corruption scandals already discovered up to date
t in region j and the number of new ones discovered at date t 10, and these controls are
defined separately for each political orientation of the scandal c. To take into account how
the coverage of corruption scandals by newspaper i at date t is affected by the general
coverage of this type of news within the Italian market of newspapers, we control for the
number of articles about episodes of corruption in region j produced by Il Corriere della
Sera at the date t11, which is also calculated separately for each political orientation of
the scandal c. In addition, among the first group of controls there are also three variables
accounting for the possible heterogeneity in the coverage of corruption scandals linked to
the Italian political framework both at regional and national level at date t, and possibly
interacting with the newspaper i ’s ideology. Specifically, we include a dummy indicating if
the incumbent governor of region j at date t belongs to the right-wing party, the number
of consecutive terms she has been elected and a dummy signaling if the incumbent prime
minister at date t belongs to the right-wing party.
As for the group of controls varying only by year, it includes variables possibly affecting
both the propensity of the two newspapers to cover news about corruption scandals related
to the NHS in the Italian regions and the possibility that new episodes of corruption are
discovered, which could eventually lead to more articles. As covering, or even discovering,
a corruption scandal might be costly, we add the newspapers’ turnover in the year y-1 as
a control for their financial resources since we assume that higher resources could lead in
general to higher coverage.12 In order to account for the newspaper’i ’s specific interest
10We considered as already discovered all those corruption scandals which appear in our sample (considering
also Il Corriere della Sera) at least once before the date t, while we consider as new all those appearing for
the first time at the date t.
11This number is derived from the Factiva archive through the same procedure described in Section 2 for La
Repubblica and Il Giornale. We use Il Corriere della Sera as reference newspaper for the entire market both
because it has one of the highest and most homogeneous diffusion over the Italian territory, and because of
its widely recognized centrist ideological stance.
12We use the value lagged at y-1 to avoid possible endogeneity with the newspaper i’s current sales, which
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in the public affairs of the region j, which might ultimately affect its propensity to report
corruption stories, we use the ratio between the newspaper i ’s diffusion within the region
j and its national diffusion both at the year y-1.13
Given the number of articles produced at the date t by newspaper i about corruption
scandals in the region j being intrinsically connected with both the possibility that new
cases arise, and are discovered by the judicial authority, we employ two dummies to control
for these sources of heterogeneity. One indicates whether the public health expenditure per
capita in region j is above the national average in the year y, assuming that where there
is more money there is also more room for corruption, and the other dummy takes value
1 if the regional public expenditure in security in region j is above the national average in
the year y, as more resources for investigating on corruption are likely to lead to discover
more episodes.
4 Results
The estimates of Equation 1 are presented in Table 2. For each political orientations of
corruption scandals we run two different specifications, one without any control, and one
including all of them. Given the use of interaction terms in our regressions, in order to
make easier the general interpretation of the results we calculate in Table 3 the marginal
effects of the main explanatory variables on the expected daily number of articles produced
about corruption scandals, by political orientation of the scandals.
Starting the analysis from the articles about corruption scandals involving left-wing politi-
cians, and considering the complete specification of Equation 1 (column (2) of Table 2),
Il Giornale produces in general 0.21 articles more in the 14 days before the election than
in other periods, corresponding to 1.70 daily articles against 1.50 (column (1) of Table
3). Although such difference is only weakly significant (at 10%), it accounts for 38% of Il
Giornale’s standard deviation in the number of articles produced per observation about
might be influenced by the coverage of corruption scandals.
13We use the value lagged at y-1 in order avoid feasible endogeneity with the newspaper i ’s current relative
diffusion in region j, which might be influenced by the its coverage of corruption scandals.
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left episodes of corruption (first column of the bottom part of Table 1). Concerning La
Repubblica, it does not show any significant difference in its coverage of this kind of news
with respect to Il Giornale neither during electoral times, nor in other periods, even if it
does actually produce less articles about left episodes both in no electoral periods (1.07
against 1.50 produced by Il Giornale) and within 14 days from the election (1.29 against
1.70 produced by Il Giornale). Indeed, although also La Repubblica seems to experience
an increase in the daily number of articles about left episodes of corruption when elections
are approaching (around 0.22, from 1.07 to 1.29), this difference is not statistically differ-
ent from zero. In addition, as also Il Giornale increases the number of articles about left
episodes of corruption in electoral times by almost the same degree, the general difference
between the two newspapers does not vary when elections are approaching but remains
almost stable as the coefficient for Rep×Election shows (column (2) of Table 2).
As for the articles about corruption scandals involving right-wing politicians (column (4)
of Table 2, and column (2) of Table 3), Il Giornale reduces in a significant way during
election times the daily number of these articles of about 0.36 pieces, from an already low
mean in no electoral periods (0.42 and not significantly different from zero), representing
55% of the standard deviation in the number of articles about right episodes of corruption
per observation for this newspaper (second column of the bottom part of Table 1). Like for
the left episodes of corruption, also for the right ones the difference between the number
of daily articles produced by La Repubblica and Il Giornale is not statistically different
from zero, neither in no electoral periods, nor within 14 days from the elections, even if its
size is definitively greater than for the left episodes, as showed in column (4) of Table 2
(1.04 articles within no electoral periods and 1.45 articles during electoral times). Moreover
also in this case the differences between the number of articles produced by La Repubblica
within 14 days before the elections is not statistically different from the same number in
the other periods, being the former just slightly bigger than the latter (1.51 against 1.46
in no electoral times). Differently from the previous case, now the difference in how the
daily number of articles varies between the two newspapers as the election is approaching
is positive and strongly significant: as the election gets closer, the difference in the daily
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number of articles about right episodes of corruption between La Repubblica and Il Giornale
significantly changes by increasing of about 0.41 articles (from 1.04 to 1.45). In particular,
such increase is mainly driven by the reduction in the number of articles by Il Giornale
rather than to an increase in the coverage of this type of news by La Repubblica, that we
found to be very small (1.46 against 1.51).
Finally, with respect to corruption scandals not involving politicians, also in this case Il
Giornale reduces its daily coverage by about 1 article as the election gets closer (column
(6) of Table 2), moving from 1.62 articles before the electoral period to 0.63 in the elec-
toral times. The impact is statistically significant, stronger than for the right episodes,
corresponding to 150% of the standard deviation in the daily number of articles about no
political episodes of corruption for this newspaper (column (3) of the bottom part of Table
1). As for the other types of corruption scandals, also with respect to those not involving
politicians, La Repubblica does not show significant differences in the daily number of arti-
cles about these scandals with respect to Il Giornale, neither in no electoral periods (0.52
articles less than Il Giornale), nor in electoral times (0.66 articles more than Il Giornale).
Still consistently with the other types of corruption scandals, the daily number of articles
produced by La Repubblica within 14 days before the election is not statistically different
from the same number in other periods (1.10 against 1.29 in election times). Furthermore,
as for the right episodes of corruption, the difference in how the daily number of articles
varies between the two newspapers as the elections approach is positive and strongly sig-
nificant, and even greater than for the right episodes of corruption, signaling that as the
elections draw near the difference in the daily number of articles about no political episodes
of corruption between La Repubblica and Il Giornale significantly changes by increasing of
about 1.18 articles (0.52 articles less in no electoral periods against 0.66 articles more in
electoral times), and just like the right episodes of corruption this increase is essentially
driven by the reduction in the number of articles about scandals not involving politicians by
Il Giornale rather than to an increase in the coverage of this type of news by La Repubblica.
To sum up, our results support the existence of a partisan ‘electoral cycle bias’ in the
coverage of news about corruption scandals by Il Giornale, whose sign depends on the
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interaction between its own ideology and the political orientation of the scandals. As the
elections get closer, it increases significantly the daily number of articles about episodes
involving left-wing politicians, whereas it diminishes significantly the number of those about
right-wing politicians and those not involving politicians. On the contrary, such electoral
cycle in the coverage of corruption scandals is not detectable for La Repubblica, regardless of
the political orientation of the individuals involved in the scandals. Indeed, although as the
elections draw near it increases the daily production of articles about corruption scandals
of whatever kind, such increases are never statistically different from zero. Moreover, we
do not find evidence supporting the existence of an ideological bias affecting the coverage
of corruption scandals by La Repubblica. Despite this newspaper produces in general less
articles about left episodes of corruption (0.43 articles less in no electoral periods and 0.41 in
election times) and more articles about right episodes than Il Giornale (1.06 articles more
in no electoral periods and 1.46 in election times), these differences are never significantly
different from zero. The absence of both an ideological bias and an electoral cycle bias in
the coverage of corruption scandals by La Repubblica might be related to a lower degree of
ideological polarization with respect to Il Giornale and (or) to the higher average number of
readers, which ultimately demand to cover more corruption scandals, independently from
the timing and the political orientation of the scandals, in order to satisfy their interest
for this kind of news.
5 Robustness checks
In this section we check the robustness of our results with respect to a different specification
of the regression model, to the potential endogeneity of some rounds of elections, and to
different definitions of the time frame before the next electoral round.
5.1 A different specification
By construction, our dependent variable can take up only strictly positive and integer val-
ues. For this reason, as a first robustness test, we properly consider the three dependent
18
variables as count variables and we re-run the models employing the same explanatory
variables and controls included in Equation 1, but using now a Negative Binomial speci-
fication. We prefer the Negative Binomial model to a Poisson model since our dependent
variables are affected by over dispersion (Figure 3): regardless of the political orientation,
the average number of articles per observation is always around three times greater than
its variance. Indeed, as clear from Figure 4, the Negative Binomial distribution fits defini-
tively better than a Poisson the actual distribution, for all the possible political orientation
of the scandals.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the daily number of articles about corruption scandals.
Note: The figure shows the distribution of the daily number of articles about of the cases of corruption
scandals in the Italian regions related to the NHS produced from 2002 to 2014, disentangled by political
orientation of the individuals involved in the scandals. The green line in each graph represents the density
of a normal distribution calculated with respect to our estimation samples.
The results of this test are presented in Table 4, where reported coefficients represents
Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR), while the marginal effects on the number of articles per
observation is provided in Table 5.14
Both the estimates and the expected number of articles per observation are very much
14Each incidence rate is computed considering the average number of pages included in each newspaper in
the period 2002-2014. Additional details about this variable are provided in the Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Comparison between different distributions of the number of articles about corruption scandals.
Note: The figure shows the actual distribution of the observations within the estimation sample for each
political orientation of the corruption scandals (blue lines), against both a Poisson (green lines) and a
Negative binomial distribution (red lines).
consistent with our baseline specification. Il Giornale produces 21% more articles about
left episodes of corruption during election times than in other periods (2.21 against 2.68),
and it reduces those about no political episodes by about 50% (from 2.08 to 1.03), but
differently from the LSDV model, it does not significantly vary the number of articles
about scandals involving right-wing politicians (from 0.89 to 0.82). As in the main analysis,
regardless of the political orientation of the corruption scandals, La Repubblica does not
show any significant variation in its coverage of such scandals, neither as the elections draw
near, nor with respect to Il Giornale in electoral and no electoral periods, thus confirming
its general low degree of ideological bias. Nonetheless, still similar to the LSDV models, La
Repubblica increases significantly in election times its difference in the number of articles
about right and non political episodes of corruption with respect to Il Giornale (of about
20% and 123% respectively), but again the difference with its own production in no electoral
periods is not significant, signaling the absence of an electoral cycle bias for this newspaper.
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5.2 A different sample
The discovery of a corruption scandal, and its extensive coverage by newspapers, could lead
the incumbent regional governor to resign; eventually, this will imply an anticipation of
the electoral round with respect to its normal schedule. Such reverse effect of the coverage
of the scandals by newspapers on the electoral cycle might induce endogeneity in our
estimates. In particular, we could end up with some observations (i.e., those between the
date of the last electoral round and the date of the governor’s resignation) whose distance
from the election does not reflect the normal conclusion of a legislation, being anticipated
exactly because of the corruption scandal. According to Italian legislation, which requires
call for new elections to take several months, the very short time frame we consider should
exclude any effects of this kind. Yet, we checked for cases of corruption ended up with the
resignation of elected governors. There are only two such cases in our sample: one refers to
the left-wing politician Ottaviano del Turco, who was elected governor of Regione Abruzzo
on April 4th 2005 and resigned on July 17th 2008 (new elections took place December
14th-15th 2008); the second one refers to the right-wing politician Roberto Formigoni, who
was elected governor of Regione Lombardia on March 29th 2010 and resigned on October
26th 2012 (new elections took place February 24th-25th 2013).
In order to test the robustness of our results with respect to this issue we re-run Equation
1, excluding from the sample all the observations for these two regions, recorded between
the pairs of dates described above. These new estimates are presented in Table 6 while
the marginal effects are showed in Table 7. Results are largely confirmed, both in terms of
magnitude and significance. The only difference concerns the variation in the coverage by
Il Giornale of corruption scandals involving right-wing politicians within 14 days from the
election which is still negative but no longer significant. This result is hardly surprising and
shows the importance of the case involving the right wing politician Roberto Formigoni
for Il Giornale. Differently from other governors, Mr. Formigoni is a key figure also in
the national politics (he has recently been a member of the Italian Senate) and shared
significant linkages with Mr. Berlusconi.
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5.3 Different definitions of the distance from elections
We finally test the robustness of our results with respect to the definition of the time
interval to elections. Specifically, instead of considering the 14 days frame, we use as
alternative time intervals 0-7 days (1 week), 0-28 days (4 weeks), 0-42 days (6 weeks) and
0-56 days (8 weeks).
The results of this test are showed in Table 8 and 9. The use of different time periods
for defining the dummy Election does not affect our main results, since also these new
estimates are very similar in sign, magnitude and significance to those showed in Table 2.
Moreover, looking at the size of the coefficients, they are decreasing in the length of the
interval considered15, a result which brings further support to the existence of an ‘electoral
cycle bias’ in the coverage of news about corruption scandals.
6 Conclusions
It is hardly surprising that, in a democracy, politicians have strong incentives to use policy
tools to influence voters’ preferences when elections get near. But an issue that the political
budget cycle literature as only marginally discussed is the role of media in this strategy,
which is driven by both users’ preferences and the ideological stance of the media. The
literature on the political economy of mass media has discussed so far a number of dimen-
sions on which media can operate an ideological selection: the issue to be covered, the
specific aspects of the issue to highlight or exclude, how facts are presented and discussed
and which sources to rely on. In this work we add to the literature by investigating the
existence of an ideological bias in the coverage of news about corruption induced by the
electoral cycle. Our empirical analysis is based on an original database containing all the
articles produced by two of the most important Italian newspapers which are also charac-
15The absence of news from Il Giornale about right episodes of corruption within 7 days from the elections
(which does not allow us to estimate the coefficient for Rep×Election) might be interpreted as an evidence
in favor of the stronger effect of the electoral cycle on Il Giornale’s coverage of right episodes of corruption
as the distance from the elections comes closer. The “electoral cycle bias” is so strong that this newspaper
prefer to avoid completely to publish articles about this kind of scandals as the elections are very close in
order to minimize possible negative effects on the right-wing politicians running for the election.
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terized by a clear ideological stance (La Repubblica and Il Giornale, left and right-oriented
respectively) about corruption scandals related to public health care in the Italian regions
during the period 2002-2014. News about corruption in health care have an high value
for regional elections in Italy, since health spending makes up the largest share of regional
budgets.
Our results supports the existence of a partisan ‘electoral cycle bias’ in the coverage of
news about corruption scandals by Il Giornale only. As the elections get closer, this
newspaper increases significantly the daily number of articles about episodes involving left-
wing politicians, whereas it diminishes significantly the number of those about right-wing
politicians and those not involving politicians. On the contrary, we do not find evidence of
an ‘electoral cycle bias’ in the coverage of corruption scandals by La Repubblica. Moreover,
despite La Repubblica produces in general less articles about left episodes of corruption and
more articles about right episodes than Il Giornale, these differences are never significantly
different from zero. The absence of both an ideological bias and an electoral cycle bias in
the coverage of corruption scandals by La Repubblica might be related to a lower degree of
ideological polarization with respect to Il Giornale and (or) to the higher average number of
readers, which ultimately demand to cover more corruption scandals, independently from
the timing and the political orientation of the scandals, in order to satisfy their interest
for this kind of news. All of which might be related to the degree of competitiveness of the
Italian market for news, which is lower than what observed for instance in the US.
Unfortunately, due to the reduced number of observations available, we are not able here
to properly identify the possible impact on the electoral outcomes of the bias detected for
Il Giornale. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence on the two cases ended up with governors
resignation shows that corruption news are particularly salient for voters. In Lombardia,
the vote share for the right-wing coalition declined from 56.11 per cent in 2010 – before the
scandal involving Mr. Formigoni – to 42.81 per cent in 2013. The right-wing coalition still
had the majority, but the new governor was expressed by a different party in the coalition.
Moreover, the vote share of the party supporting Mr. Formigoni halved, from 31.79 percent
in 2013 to 16 percent in 2010. In Abruzzo, the winning left-wing coalition in 2005 – before
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the scandal involving Mr. Del Turco – lost the majority in the 2008 elections, with the
vote share declining from 58.24 per cent to 42.67 percent.
Finally, the results produced in this study might have at least two important implications.
First, from a positive standpoint, since corruption is - by definition - unobservable, a biased
reporting of corruption news implies biased perceptions of corruption in a given country.
This bias might help explain findings of corruption cycles in Sidorkin and Vorobyev (2017),
and it induces some cautions in the use of corruption measures (like the standard Corrup-
tion Perception Index produced by Transparency International, widely used in economics
research), since they might be influenced by unexpected factors like the size of a reader-
ship, or the closeness to elections. This is also true for the specific cases of corruption
we are considering here, which relates to a sector quite vulnerable to corruption all over
the world (see, e.g., Vian (2008)). Second, from a normative standpoint, since corruption
news are salient for voters and can influence electoral outcomes (see, e.g., Costas-Pere`z
et al. (2012)), our findings support the view of full transparency on the linkages between
media owners and political parties – if not a clear separation between the two – to make
the democratic mechanism to work better (Corneo, 2006).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Left episodes Left episodes Right episodes Right episodes NP episodes NP episodes
Rep 0.141*** -0.428 0.016 1.043 -0.027 -0.520
(0.045) (0.679) (0.067) (0.994) (0.0823) (0.837)
Election 0.212* 0.207* 0.317*** -0.361** -0.263*** -0.989***
(0.102) (0.116) (0.061) (0.138) (0.070) (0.267)
RepXElection 0.0179 0.0160 -0.182** 0.410*** 0.693*** 1.180***
(0.206) (0.195) (0.067) (0.074) (0.184) (0.281)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Month dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Day dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 339 339 383 383 345 345
R2 0.019 0.329 0.002 0.342 0.014 0.270
Table 2: LSDV estimation results
Dependent variables: Daily number of articles about corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians
(columns (1) and (2)), right-wing politicians (columns (3) and (4)) or any political party (columns
(5) and (6)). All the estimates are obtained through the Least Square Dummy Variable regression model presented
in Equation 1. Column (2) controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians
already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily
number of articles about left episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at
date t. Column (4) controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals involving right-wing politicians already
discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number
of articles about right episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t.
Column (6) controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals with any political connection already discovered
in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles
about no political episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t.
Columns (2),(4) and (6) also control if the incumbent governor in region j at time t belongs to the right-wing party,
for the number of consecutive terms she has been elected, if the incumbent prime minister at the date t belongs to the
right-wing party, for the newspapers’ turnover at the year y-1, for the ratio at the year y-1 between the newspapers’
diffusion within region j and at national level, if the public health expenditure per capita in region j at the year y is
above the national average and if the public expenditure in security in region j at the year y is above the national
average. Moreover they all contain dummies to account for region-fixed effects, month-fixed effects, day-fixed effects
and year-fixed effects. The bottom part of the table reports the R2 of each specification. All the standard errors are
robust to heteroschedasticity and clustered by newspaper for each region. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
Left episodes Right episodes NP episodes
La RepubblicaXNo Election 1.07*** 1.46*** 1.10***
La RepubblicaXElection 1.29*** 1.51*** 1.29**
Il GiornaleXNo Election 1.50*** 0.42 1.62**
Il GiornaleXElection 1.70*** 0.05 0.63
La RepubblicaXElection - La RepubblicaXNo Election 0.22 0.05 0.19
Il GiornaleXElection - Il GiornaleXNo Election 0.21* -0.36** -0.99***
La RepubblicaXNoElection - Il GiornaleXNoElection -0.43 1.04 -0.52
La RepubblicaXElection - Il GiornaleXElection -0.41 1.45 0.66
Table 3: Marginal effects on the expected number of daily articles about corruption
scandals.
Note: The upper part of the table shows the marginal effect on the expected daily number of articles
about corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians (columns (1)) or right-wing politicians (columns
(2)). All the values rely on the coefficients presented in Table 2, and in particular to the most completed
specifications (columns (2) and (4) of Table 2). The bottom part of the table provides the differences in the
number of articles produced by La Repubblica in no electoral periods and electoral times, by Il Giornale
in no electoral periods and electoral periods, by the two newspapers in no electoral times and by the two
newspapers as the elections approach. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
Left episodes Right episodes No-political episodes
La Rep 0.465 1.523 0.518
[0.224] [1.149] [0.284]
Election 1.212** 0.919 0.495***
[0.103] [0.094] [0.083]
La RepXElection 1.000 1.203*** 2.233***
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Day dummies Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 339 383 345
Table 4: Negative Binomial estimation results.
Dependent variables: Daily number of articles about corruption scan-
dals involving left-wing politicians (columns (1)), right-wing politi-
cians (columns (2)) or any political party (columns (3)). All the es-
timates are obtained through a Negative Binomial regression model and they
are all presented as Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR). Column (1) controls for the
cumulative number of corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians already
discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered
at date t, and the daily number of articles about left episodes of corruption in the
NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. Column (2)
controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals involving right-wing
politicians already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of
new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about right
episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della
Sera at date t. Column (3) controls for the cumulative number of corruption
scandals with any political connection already discovered in the region j up to
the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily num-
ber of articles about no political episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region
j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. Columns (1), (2) and (3) also
control if the incumbent governor in region j at time t belongs to the right-wing
party, for the number of consecutive terms she has been elected, if the incumbent
prime minister at the date t belongs to the right-wing party, for the newspapers’
turnover at the year y-1, for the ratio at the year y-1 between the newspapers’
diffusion within region j and at national level, if the public health expenditure
per capita in region j at the year y is above the national average and if the
public expenditure in security in region j at the year y is above the national
average. Moreover, they all contain dummies to account for region-fixed effects,
year-fixed effects, month-fixed effects, day-fixed effects. We use as exposure vari-
able for each newspaper the average number of pages it includes along the period
2002-2014, corresponding to 60 for La Repubblica and 40 for Il Giornale. All the
standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and clustered by newspaper for
each region. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
Left episodes Right episodes No political episodes
La RepubblicaXNo Election 1.03*** 1.35*** 1.08***
La RepubblicaXElection 1.25*** 1.49*** 1.19***
Il GiornaleXNo Election 2.21*** 0.89** 2.08**
Il GiornaleXElection 2.68*** 0.82** 1.03**
La RepubblicaXElection - La RepubblicaXNo Election 0.22 0.14 0.11
Il GiornaleXElection - Il GiornaleXNo Election 0.47*** -0.07 -1.05**
La RepubblicaXNoElection - Il GiornaleXNoElection 1.18 0.46 -1
La RepubblicaXElection - Il GiornaleXElection -1.43 0.68 0.16
Table 5: Marginal effects on the expected number of daily articles about corruption
scandals - Negative Binomial.
Note: The table shows the marginal effect on the expected daily number of articles about corruption scandals
involving left-wing politicians (columns (1)), right-wing politicians (columns (2)) or any political party (columns
(3)). All the values rely on the coefficients presented in Table 4. The bottom part of the table provides the differences
in the number of articles produced by La Repubblica in no electoral periods and electoral times, by Il Giornale in
no electoral periods and electoral periods, by the two newspapers in no electoral times and by the two newspapers
as the elections approach. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
Left episodes Right episodes No-political episodes
Rep -0.104 0.295 -0.518
[0.526] [1.398] [0.835]
Election 0.234** -0.0861 -0.993***
[0.105] [0.154] [0.264]
RepXElection 0.0460 0.270*** 1.185***
[0.136] [0.0777] [0.287]
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes
Day dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 334 308 342
R2 0.277 0.349 0.269
Table 6: LSDV estimation results - different estimation
sample.
Dependent variables: Daily number of articles about corruption
scandals involving left-wing politicians (columns (1)), right-wing
politicians (columns (2)) or any political party (columns (3)). All
the estimates are obtained through the Least Square Dummy Variable regres-
sion model presented in Equation 1. Column (1) controls for the cumulative
number of corruption scandals involving left-wing politicians already discov-
ered in the region j up to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at
date t, and the daily number of articles about left episodes of corruption in the
NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. Column (2)
controls for the cumulative number of corruption scandals involving right-wing
politicians already discovered in the region j up to the date t, the number of
new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily number of articles about right
episodes of corruption in the NHS in the region j produced by Il Corriere della
Sera at date t. Column (3) controls for the cumulative number of corruption
scandals with any political connection already discovered in the region j up
to the date t, the number of new scandals discovered at date t, and the daily
number of articles about no political episodes of corruption in the NHS in the
region j produced by Il Corriere della Sera at date t. All the columns also
control if the incumbent governor in region j at time t belongs to the right-
wing party, for the number of consecutive terms she has been elected, if the
incumbent prime minister at the date t belongs to the right-wing party, for
the newspapers’ turnover at the year y-1, for the ratio at the year y-1 between
the newspapers’ diffusion within region j and at national level, if the public
health expenditure per capita in region j at the year y is above the national
average and if the public expenditure in security in region j at the year y is
above the national average. Moreover they all contain dummies to account for
region-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, month-fixed effects, day-fixed effects.
The bottom part of the table reports the R2 of each specification. All the
standard errors are robust to heteroschedasticity and clustered by newspaper
for each region. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
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(1) (2) (3)
Left episodes Right episodes No political episodes
La RepubblicaXNo Election 1.13*** 1.23*** 1.11***
La RepubblicaXElection 1.40*** 1.41*** 1.30**
Il GiornaleXNo Election 1.23*** 0.93 1.63**
Il GiornaleXElection 1.47*** 0.85 0.63
La RepubblicaXElection - La RepubblicaXNo Election 0.27 0.18 0.19
Il GiornaleXElection - Il GiornaleXNo Election 0.24** -0.08 -1***
La RepubblicaXNoElection - Il GiornaleXNoElection -0.10 0.30 0.52
La RepubblicaXElection - Il GiornaleXElection -0.07 0.56 0.67
Table 7: Marginal effects on the expected number of daily articles about corruption
scandals - different estimation sample.
Note: The table shows the marginal effect on the expected daily number of articles about corruption scandals
involving left-wing politicians (columns (1)), right-wing politicians (columns (2)) or any political party (columns
(3)). All the values rely on the coefficients presented in Table 6. The bottom part of the table provides the differences
in the number of articles produced by La Repubblica in no electoral periods and electoral times, by Il Giornale in
no electoral periods and electoral periods, by the two newspapers in no electoral times and by the two newspapers
as the elections approach. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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Appendix A
This Appendix describes in details the searching procedure applied to the Factiva archive in
order to collect all the articles produced by La Repubblica, Il Giornale and Il Corriere della
Sera about corruption scandals related to the NHS within the Italian regions. We accessed
the Factiva database during the last week of April 2014, collecting all the articles appearing
up to this date. For selecting the articles we firstly created two lists of Italian words, one
related to the health system and the other to corruption. We then made a search on the
Factiva database, exploiting its own searching tool and employing each time as keywords
a different pair of words included in these lists, one from each, and we selected all the
articles published by the three Italian newspapers containing both words in each combina-
tion. The semantic list concerning the health system included four words, that is “Sanita´”
(health system), “SSN ” (NHS), “ospedale/i” (hospital(s)). The semantic list related to
corruption contained eleven words, that is “corruzione” (corruption), “scandalo/i” (scan-
dal(s)), “tangente/i” (bribe(s)), “mazzetta/e” (bribe(s)), “appalto/i truccato/i” (rigged
contract(s)) and “rimborso/i falso/i” (fraudulent reimbursement(s)).
Once the articles have been selected, we dropped all those not strictly concerning the
corruption in the Italian NHS by a direct reading of each of them. For instance, we
excluded those actually including a specific pair of keywords but in a different context (as
for instance within a film review), or those about corruption scandals happening abroad.
Since several articles contain at the same time different pairs of keywords, they appear
more than once among the ones selected with our procedure; thus, we also dropped all
duplicates from the sample.
For each article we collect the following information:
• The name of the newspaper producing the article;
• The date of the article (day/month/year);
• The specific case of corruption which the article refers to;
• The reference region of the case of corruption which the article refers to;
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• If the case of corruption involves politicians;
• The political orientation of the individual(s) involved in the corruption scandal (left-
wing or right-wing).
According to such information, we drop from the final sample also the articles not referring
to any specific case of corruption in the NHS, and those about nationwide corruption
scandals. Lastly, we drop all the articles concerning cases of corruption discovered before
the inclusion of the Corriere della Sera in the Factiva database (i.e. before 1997).
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Appendix B
The following list reports all the variables employed in the analysis presented in this paper,
their description and the source(s) from which we collected the necessary information for
their definition.
• Articlescijt: The number of articles produced at the date t (day/month/year) by the
newspaper i (La Repubblica or Il Giornale) about corruption scandals with political
orientation c (left episodes, right episodes, no political episodes) related to the NHS
in the Italian region j. The information for building this variable is retrieved from the
Factiva database, as described in details in the Appendix A. In particular we collect
all the articles produced by the two newspapers since they have started to digitalize
them, which correspond to 2002 for Il Giornale and 2005 for La Repubblica, up to
the date of our access to the Factiva database, that is the last week of April 2014.
• Repi: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation at the date t is related to
La Repubblica and 0 otherwise. The information for constructing this variable is
retrieved for the Factiva database, as described in details the Appendix A.
• Electionjt : A dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation at the date t (day/
month/year) is within 14 days (two weeks) from the next electoral round in the
Italian region j and 0 otherwise. For constructing this variable we matched the
information about the dates of the articles derived from the Factiva database with
the information concerning regional elections within each Italian region, as provided
by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs via its official web page.
• OldEpisodescjt: The number of cases of corruption in the NHS with political orien-
tation c (left episodes, right episodes, no political episodes) in the region j already
discovered up to the date t (day/month/year). We consider as already discovered all
those corruption scandals which appear at least once before the date t in our sample
of articles derived from the Factiva database (including also Il Corriere della Sera).
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• NewEpisodescjt: The number of cases of corruption in the NHS with political orien-
tation c (left episodes, right episodes, no political episodes) in the region j discovered
at the date t (day/month/year). We consider as discovered at the date t all those
corruption scandals which appear for the first time at the date t in our sample of
articles derived from the Factiva database (including also Il Corriere della Sera).
• Corrierecijt: The number of articles produced at the date t (day/month/year) by
Il Corriere della Sera about corruption scandals with political orientation c (left
episodes, right episodes, no political episodes) related to the NHS in the Italian
region j. The information for constructing this variable is retrieved for the Factiva
database, as described in details in the Appendix A. In particular we collect all the
articles produced by this newspaper from the beginning of January 2002 to the end
of April 2014.
• RGovernorjt : A dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent governor of region j at
the date t (day/month/year) belongs to the Italian right-wing party and 0 otherwise.
For constructing this variable we matched the information about the dates of the
articles derived from the Factiva database with the information concerning regional
elections in each Italian region, as provided by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs
through its official web page.
• Mandatesjt : The number of consecutive mandates run by the incumbent governor
of the Italian region j at the date t (day/month/year). For constructing this variable
we matched the information about the dates of the articles derived from the Factiva
database with the information concerning regional elections in each Italian region, as
provided by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs through its official web page.
• RPrimet : A dummy variable equal to 1 if the incumbent Italian Prime Minister at
the date t (day/month/year) belongs to the Italian right-wing part and 0 otherwise.
For constructing this variable we matched the information about the dates of the
articles derived from the Factiva database with the information concerning regional
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elections in each Italian region, as provided by the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs
through its official web page.
• Turnoveri(y−1 ): The total turnover of newspaper i (La Repubblica or Il Giornale)
in the year y-1 expressed in logarithmic scale. We derive the information for con-
structing this variable from the report “La Stampa in Italia” produced yearly by
Federazione Italiana Editori Giornali (FIEG). The raw information is available for
all the years in the interval 2002-2012. We impute the value for 2013 and 2014 using
the average between the values recorded during the five years before.
• Diffusionij (y−1 ): The ratio between the newspaper i ’s number of copies sold in
region j and the total number of copies sold over the entire Italian territory in the
year y-1. We derive the information for constructing this variable directly from
the web page of the Accertamenti Diffusione Stampa (ADS), which provides such
information for all the years within the interval 2002-2014.
• HealthExpXCapitajy : A dummy variable equal to 1 if the the public health ex-
penditure per capita in region j is above the national average in the year y and 0
otherwise. The information for constructing the variable is directly derived for all
the years within the interval 2002-2014 from the database “Health for All” produced
by the ISTAT.
• SecExpXCapitajy : A dummy variable equal to 1 if the the public expenditure for
law and order per capita in region j is above the national average in the year y and
0 otherwise. The information for constructing the variable is directly derived from
the database “I.Stat” produced by the ISTAT for all the years within the interval
2002-2012. We impute the values for 2013 and 2014 with the average between the
values recorded during the five years before.
• NPagesi : The average number of pages included in each newspaper along the pe-
riod 2002-2014. We use this variable as exposure variable in the Negative Binomial
regression model presented in section 5.2. The value for this variable correspond to
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60 for La Repubblica and 40 for Il Giornale and they rely on our own calculation on
the information provided within the Factiva archive.
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